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U.S. Arms Sales to China: Historical Precedents and Contemporary Possibilities

Eric Zhu
3 hours ago
3 min read
The New York Times. (2026, September 26). https://cn.nytimes.com/business/20260926/china-trump-xi-truce/
The New York Times. (2026, September 26). https://cn.nytimes.com/business/20260926/china-trump-xi-truce/

During the 2026 state visit hosted in Washington, D.C., in September of this year, U.S. President Donald Trump asked whether China would be interested in purchasing American weapons during an official state visit. This was what David Perdue, the American ambassador to China, said in a television interview on September 27th, 2026.


President Trump later denied that the topic was ever mentioned, but the incident raises the question of whether U.S. arms sales to China are feasible today. Currently, the U.S. government is prohibited from selling military equipment to China under a military arms embargo set in 1989, and thus any chance of direct arms sales would be impossible.


Hypothetically, what if the arms embargo didn’t exist?


Before 1989, China and the U.S. maintained a strong diplomatic relationship built on a shared intent to defend against the Soviet Union and on China's internal economic changes. The Sino-Soviet split in the 1970s––releasing decades of political tension between the two neighboring powers––and Deng Xiaoping’s “Reform and opening-up” efforts in economic modernization both provided excellent incentives for the U.S. to intervene and aid China not only as an additional ally to counter Soviet influence in East Asia, but as a trading partner in the Pacific as well. Bilateral relations saw significant exchanges, including numerous advanced or major military projects and technologies such as helicopters, military avionics, and turbine engines in the years following National Security Decision Directive 11, signed by President Reagan in 1981, allowing China to make significant leaps in military technology in nearly every branch.


In a world where the arms embargo never ended, even more ambitious proposals like the sale of advanced fighter aircraft may have been achieved, creating a more internationally integrated and reliant version of the People’s Liberation Army that we know of today.


Back to the modern day, we know that an arms sale to China is completely out of the question. So, why would President Trump make such a remark?


It is no secret that Trump wishes to maintain a positive relationship with China. His decision to delay a $14 billion defense package bound for Taiwan certainly suggests this possibility when put in conjunction of his praise of the Chinese leadership. On that basis, it’s reasonable to assume Trump made this comment to make up for America’s military obligations to Taiwan and to balance the relationship between both governments. The careful balance between China and Taiwan has long been a difficult question for the U.S. government, and Trump appears not to want to provoke mainland China, as his recent statements and actions suggest.


It is well known that President Trump is not the most serious when it comes to his verbal and text statements. This could simply be an offhand comment meant to ease tensions and signal friendly intent.


This brings up another hypothetical: if he were serious, what kinds of technologies would he be willing to provide?


More advanced, complete systems like combat aircraft and missiles are out of the question, but smaller or lower-end items and technologies may still be able to cross the Pacific.

So far, the U.S. is still ahead of China in areas like jet engines and advanced chips. It wouldn’t be implausible for Trump to relax some export restrictions to make them more accessible to mainland China, easing tensions and giving China reason to ease its chokehold on rare earths. This, of course, would come at the expense of Taiwan’s holistic security, as it would directly strengthen China’s military capabilities and undermine the existing tension that the island nations rely on for their defense.


The national security establishment would no doubt oppose such a decision, but the arms embargo and ITAR may be bypassed by allowing certain dual-use technologies through. The enforcement of export control on technologies that are not explicitly military can be difficult due to the vague definition and context in which they may be sold, and as such, these dual-use technologies may find their way into China in the event that such sales are to occur.



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